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In plant–pollinator communities many pollinators are potential generalists and
their preferences for certain plants can change quickly in response to changes in
plant and pollinator densities. These changes in preferences affect coexistence within
pollinator guilds as well as within plant guilds. Using a mathematical model, we
study how adaptations of pollinator preferences influence population dynamics of a
two-plant–two-pollinator community interaction module. Adaptation leads to co-
existence between generalist and specialist pollinators, and produces complex plant
population dynamics, involving alternative stable states and discrete transitions in
the plant community. Pollinator adaptation also leads to plant–plant apparent facil-
itation that is mediated by changes in pollinator preferences. We show that adaptive
pollinator behavior reduces niche overlap and leads to coexistence by specialization
on different plants. Thus, this article documents how adaptive pollinator preferences
for plants change the structure and coexistence of plant–pollinator communities.
Keywords: ideal free distribution, isolegs, pollination services, plant resources,
critical transition
The pedigree of honey
Does not concern the bee;
A clover, any time, to him
Is aristocracy.
Poems (1890) – Emily Dickinson
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1. Introduction
Many mutualistic interactions feature direct resource-for-resource (e.g., plant–mycorrhizae,
lichens), or resource-for-service (e.g., pollination, seed dispersal) exchanges between species,
but this fact was not explicitly considered by the first models of mutualism based on the
Lotka–Volterra equations (Gause and Witt, 1935; Vandermeer and Boucher, 1978). As a result,
positive feedbacks between mutualists predicted infinite population growth. Later models con-
sidered negative density dependence at high population densities (Boucher, 1988; Hernandez,
1998; Gerla and Mooij, 2014) that stabilizes population dynamics. Increased awareness about
the consumer–resource aspects of mutualisms (Holland and DeAngelis, 2010) provides some
mechanistic underpinnings for density dependence (e.g., mutualistic benefits saturate, just like
plant growth saturates with nutrients or predator feeding saturates with prey). More recently,
differentiation between non-living mutualistic resources (e.g., mineral nutrients, nectar, fruits)
and their living providers (e.g., fungi, plant) led to several mechanistic models (Benadi et al.,
2012; Valdovinos et al., 2013; Revilla, 2015). These are very relevant for studies of plant–animal
mutualisms, like pollination and seed dispersal, for two reasons. First, competition between ani-
mals for nectar or fruits can be treated using concepts from consumer–resource theory (Grover,
1997). Second, competition between plants for pollination or seed dispersal can result from
plants influencing the preferences of animals, according to optimal foraging theory (Pyke, 2016).
In an earlier work (Revilla and Krˇivan, 2016) we analyzed coexistence conditions for two
plants competing for a single pollinator. If the pollinator is a generalist, plants can facilitate
each other by making the pollinator more abundant. Facilitation is an example of an indirect
density-mediated interaction (sensu Bolker et al., 2003) between the two plants. However, if
pollinators have adaptive preferences, a positive feedback between plant abundance and polli-
nator preferences predicts exclusion of the rare plant, which gets less pollination as pollinators
specialize on the common plant. In other words, when pollinator preferences respond to plant
densities, plants will experience competition for pollination services (in addition to competition
for other factors such as nutrients, light or space) because an increase in pollination of one plant
exerts a negative effect on the other plants that gets less pollination. In Revilla and Krˇivan
(2016) we found that plant coexistence depends on the balance between plant facilitation via
increasing abundance of the common pollinator, and competition for pollinator preferences,
which adapt in response to the relative abundance of plant resources. Pollinator preferences
were described by the ideal free distribution (IFD; Fretwell and Lucas, 1969) that predicts pol-
linator distribution between the two plants in such a way that neither of the two plants provides
pollinators with a higher payoff. For a single pollinator, the IFD is also an evolutionarily sta-
ble strategy (ESS, Krˇivan et al., 2008), i.e., once adopted by all individuals no mutant with a
different strategy can invade the resident population (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973).
In many real life settings however, plants compete for pollination services provided by several
pollinator species, which in turn compete for plant resources. Pollinator preferences for plants
respond not only to plant abundances, but also to inter- and intra-specific competition between
pollinators. Simulations of large plant–pollinator communities indicate that plant coexistence
is promoted when generalist pollinators specialize to reduce competition for resources, i.e., to
decrease niche overlap (Valdovinos et al., 2013, 2016). This is the classic competitive exclusion
principle which states that n competing species (i.e., pollinators) cannot coexist at a population
equilibrium if they are limited by less than n limiting factors (i.e., plants) (Levin, 1970).
In this article we study a mutualistic–competitive interaction module consisting of two plants
and two pollinators where pollinators behave as adaptive foragers that maximize their fitness
depending on plant resource quality and abundance. This means that depending on plant and
pollinator densities, pollinators switch between generalism and specialism. These behavioral
changes also change the topology of the interaction network. Thus, we focus on two questions:
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Under what conditions the two plants and two pollinators can coexist at an equilibrium, and
what are the corresponding community network configurations.
To gain insight, we study separately plant population dynamics at fixed pollinator densities,
and pollinator population dynamics at fixed plant densities, respectively. In both cases we com-
pare population dynamics for inflexible pollinators with those for adaptive pollinators. Under
fixed pollinator preferences (section 2), stable coexistence of plants, or pollinators, is possible at
a unique equilibrium. It is also possible that at this population equilibrium both pollinators are
generalists. Both these predictions change when pollinator preferences for plants are adaptive
(section 3). First, when pollinator densities are fixed, plants can coexist at alternative stable
states characterized by different interaction topologies given by pollinator strategy. However,
there is no plant stable coexistence when both pollinators are generalists. Second, when plant
densities are fixed, pollinators can coexist at an equilibrium only if they specialize on different
plants (section 3.3). We show how these conclusions can explain some recent experimental and
simulated results, as well as predict the effects of pollinator adaptation in real communities.
2. Population dynamics when pollinator preferences for
plants are fixed
Consider two plant populations P1 and P2 interacting with two pollinator populations A1
and A2. Mutualism is mediated by resources R1 and R2 produced by plants P1 and P2, re-
spectively. We assume that pollination is concomitant with pollinator resource consumption.
Since resources like nectar or pollen have much faster turnover dynamics (hours, days) than
plants and pollinators (weeks, months), we assume they attain a quasi-steady-state at cur-
rent plant and animal densities (Revilla, 2015). As a result, population dynamics follow the
Revilla and Krˇivan (2016) model for a single pollinator, extended for two pollinators
dP1
dt
=
(
a1(r11u1b11A1 + r12v1b12A2)
w1 + u1b11A1 + v1b12A2
(
1− P1 + c2P2
K1
)
−m1
)
P1 (1a)
dP2
dt
=
(
a2(r21u2b21A1 + r22v2b22A2)
w2 + u2b21A1 + v2b22A2
(
1− P2 + c1P1
K2
)
−m2
)
P2 (1b)
dA1
dt
=
(
a1e11u1b11P1
w1 + u1b11A1 + v1b12A2
+
a2e21u2b21P2
w2 + u2b21A1 + v2b22A2
− d1
)
A1 (1c)
dA2
dt
=
(
a1e12v1b12P1
w1 + u1b11A1 + v1b12A2
+
a2e22v2b22P2
w2 + u2b21A1 + v2b22A2
− d2
)
A2, (1d)
where Pi (i = 1, 2) is plant Pi population density, and Aj (j = 1, 2) is pollinator Aj population
density. Here ai is a plant resource production rate, wi is its spontaneous decay rate, and bij is
a pollinator specific consumption rate. In the plant equations (1a,1b), pollinator consumption
rates translate into seed production rates with efficiency rij . Plant growth is reduced by intra-
specific competition, with carrying capacity Ki, and by inter-specific competition, where ci
is the relative effect of plant i on the other plant. In the absence of pollinators, plants die
with per-capita rates mi, so plants are obligate mutualists. In the pollinator equations (1c,1d),
consumption translates into growth with efficiency ratios eij . Without plants, pollinators die
with per-capita rates dj, so pollinators are obligate mutualists too.
Pollinator A1 (A2) preferences are u1 (v1) for plant P1 and u2 = 1 − u1 (v2 = 1 − v1) for
plant P2. Preferences can be interpreted as fractions of foraging time that individual pollinators
spend on plant P1 or P2, or the proportion of a pollinator population which is visiting P1 or P2
at a given time. Preferences allows us to categorize pollinators as generalists or specialists. For
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example, if (u1, u2) = (3/4, 1/4) and (v1, v2) = (0, 1), then A1 is a generalist (biased towards
P1) and A2 is a P2 specialist. In this section we assume that pollinator preferences for plants
are fixed and we derive conditions for plant stable coexistence that are compared in section
3 with the case where pollinator preferences are adaptive. Unfortunately, the many variables
and parameters of model (1) do not allow us to analyze it at this generality. In order to gain
insights, we assume that either plants or pollinators are kept at fixed densities and employing
isocline analysis (Case, 2000) we characterize coexistence between plants (1a,1b), or between
pollinators (1c,1d).
2.1. Plant coexistence
First, we consider plant-only dynamics. Let us consider a community consisting of a single
plant Pi (i = 1, 2) and two pollinators. At fixed pollinator densities A1 and A2, the necessary
condition for plant Pi to survive is that its pollinator-dependent per-capita birth rate is higher
than its mortality rate, i.e.,
ri =
ai(ri1uibi1A1 + ri2vibi2A2)
wi + uibi1A1 + vibi2A2
> mi, (2)
in which case the plant will attain its pollinator-dependent carrying capacity
Hi = Ki
(
1− mi
ri
)
. (3)
Inequality (2) shows that if both pollinators have low preferences for plant Pi (i.e., both ui
and vi are small), the plant cannot achieve a positive growth rate and cannot invade when rare.
To invade, a plant must be attractive enough for at least one of the two pollinators.
Provided that (2) holds for both plants, the plant sub-system (1a,1b) is the Lotka-Volterra
competition model. Plant coexistence depends on inter-specific competition coefficients (c1, c2),
and the carrying capacities given by (3). Figure 1 shows all generic qualitative plant isocline
configurations and their outcomes for plant coexistence. Panel (a) shows the non-competitive
case (c1 = c2 = 0) where both plants attain their pollinator-dependent carrying capacities Hi.
Under direct competition (c1, c2 > 0) plant equilibrium densities at coexistence are lower than
Hi (panels b, c). If
c1 <
H2
H1
and c2 <
H1
H2
, (4)
isoclines intersect in the positive quadrant at the globally stable equilibrium (panel b)
(P1, P2) =
(
H1 − c2H2
1− c1c2 ,
H2 − c1H1
1− c1c2
)
.
If opposite inequalities hold in (4), the coexistence equilibrium is unstable (panel c), with
one plant outcompeting the other plant depending on the initial conditions. If the isoclines do
not intersect in the first quadrant the species with the highest (i.e., the one which is above the
other) isocline always wins (i.e., plant P1 in panel d). The height of a plant’s isocline depends
on its carrying capacity Hi. Given that Hi increases with ui and vi (since ri in (2) increases
with ui and vi), the more preferred a plant is, the more numerous will it be under conditions
of stable coexistence, or more likely it will exclude the other plant.
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Figure 1: Qualitative configurations of plant isoclines (P1 in black and P2 in gray) when pol-
linator preferences for plants and densities are fixed. Filled (open) circles represent
stable (unstable) equilibria. Circles on the axes correspond to pollinator-dependent
carrying capacities Hi given by (3).
2.2. Pollinator coexistence
Second, we consider pollinator-only dynamics. For fixed plant densities Pi (i = 1, 2), the
pollinator sub-system (1c,1d) is the resource competition model of Schoener (1978). Appendix
A shows that there are three qualitatively different pollinator equilibria. The equilibrium where
both pollinators are extinct (A1, A2) = (0, 0) is unstable if one or both pollinators is viable.
Viability conditions for pollinator A1 and A2 are, respectively,
a1P1e11u1b11w2 + a2P2e21u2b21w1 > d1w1w2 (5a)
a1P1e12v1b12w2 + a2P2e22v2b22w1 > d2w1w2. (5b)
If neither of the above inequalities holds, both pollinators go extinct. If only one inequality
holds then the corresponding pollinator is viable, and for each viable pollinator there is a
corresponding single species equilibrium (A1, 0) or (0, A2). As we see, pollinator viability implies
minimum resource requirements (Grover, 1997).
Appendix A shows that there can be at most one pollinator coexistence equilibrium (Aˆ1, Aˆ2).
Such an equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable (Appendix A) if
(u1b11v2b22 − v1b12u2b21)(e11u1b11e22v2b22 − e12v1b12e21u2b21) > 0. (6)
The interpretation of condition (6) is similar to that given by Leo´n and Tumpson (1975) for
two consumers competing for two substitutable resources: “... the competitors coexist if at
equilibrium each of them removes at a higher rate that resource which contributes more to its
own rate of growth.” To see why this is so, let us assume that plant P1 is better for the growth of
A1 (e11 > e21) and P2 is better for the growth of A2 (e22 > e12). Then, if pollinator A1 interacts
comparatively more strongly with plant P1 than with P2 (u1b11 > u2b21), and pollinator A2
interacts comparatively more strongly with plant P2 than with P1 (v2b22 > v1b12), inequality
(6) holds.
Provided both pollinators are viable (5a and 5b hold), Figure 2 shows all generic pollinator
isocline configurations corresponding to different interaction topologies (except symmetries).
The top row of this figure is analogous to Figure 1 for plants. Panel (a) shows the case where
pollinators specialize on different plants (u1 = 1, v1 = 0). The A1 isocline is vertical, the A2
isocline is horizontal, and their intersection corresponds to stable pollinator coexistence since
pollinators do not compete. Panels (b,c,d) display isoclines for two generalist pollinators (i.e.,
0 < u1 < 1, 0 < v1 < 1), i.e., both pollinators share both plants. Notice that the isoclines of
generalist pollinators are curved and intersect both axes. In (b) an isocline intersection exists
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Figure 2: Pollinator isocline configurations (A1 in black and A2 in gray) and qualitative dy-
namics (arrows), at fixed pollinator preferences. Filled (open) circles represent stable
(unstable) equilibria. Isocline shapes depend on interaction topology (inset graphs).
and the equilibrium between generalists is globally stable because (6) holds. In (c) an isocline
intersection exists but the corresponding equilibrium between generalists is unstable because
(6) does not hold and either A1 or A2 wins the competition depending on the initial conditions.
In panel (d) the isoclines do not intersect and the pollinator with the highest isocline always
wins. In other words condition (6) is irrelevant for coexistence in this case. This outcome
happens if e.g., A1 has a much lower mortality and/or higher conversion efficiencies than A2.
This case is like the case of competitive dominance between plants (Figure 1d), except that for
the plants the isoclines are linear.
Panels (e,f) display isoclines when pollinator A1 is a generalist and A2 is a P2 specialist (i.e.,
0 < u1 < 1, v1 = 0). Like in panels (b,c,d) the isocline of the generalist is curved, but the
specialist isocline is linear. Under these condition, condition (6) is trivially satisfied (because
v1 = 0). Thus, if both isoclines intersect, the corresponding coexistence equilibrium is always
globally stable like in panel (e), and if they do not intersect the species with the highest isocline
always wins (e.g., A1 in panel (f)). In other words, competition between a generalist and a
specialist pollinator does not admit the bi-stable case (i.e., panel c).
Finally, in panel (g) both pollinators specialize on plant P1, (e.g., u1 = v1 = 1). In this
case both pollinators have parallel linearly decreasing isoclines, and the pollinator with the
higher isocline (i.e., A1 in this case) excludes the other pollinator. This case is like the case of
competitive dominance between plants (Figure 1d), except that for the plants the isoclines are
not required to be parallel.
3. Population dynamics when pollinator preferences for
plants are adaptive
In this section we assume that pollinator preferences adaptively change as plant and pollinator
densities change. First (section 3.1), we use a game theoretic approach (Krˇivan et al., 2008) to
derive optimal pollinator preferences at given plant and pollinator densities. Second (section
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3.2), we analyze competition between plants at fixed pollinator densities. Third (section 3.3),
we analyze competition between pollinators at fixed plant densities.
3.1. Optimal pollinator preferences
Let us consider a mutant pollinator A1 with preference u˜1 ∈ [0, 1] for the first plant and a
mutant pollinator A2 with preference v˜1 ∈ [0, 1] in a resident population of pollinators with
average preferences u1 and v1, respectively. The payoff a pollinator obtains when pollinating
plant i (i = 1, 2) is given by the per-capita pollinator birth rate. For example, from (1c)
the payoff of a pollinator A1 when pollinating plant P2 is a2e21b21P2
w2+u2b21A1+v2b22A2
. As the resident
pollinator distribution between the two plants is the same as are their preferences we see that
payoffs depend on the distribution of pollinators between the two plants. Fitnesses of A1 and
A2 mutants are defined as their mean payoffs
F1(u˜1; u1, v1) =
a1e11b11P1
w1 + u1b11A1 + v1b12A2
u˜1 +
a2e21b21P2
w2 + u2b21A1 + v2b22A2
u˜2, (7a)
F2(v˜1; u1, v1) =
a1e12b12P1
w1 + u1b11A1 + v1b12A2
v˜1 +
a2e22b22P2
w2 + u2b21A1 + v2b22A2
v˜2. (7b)
Throughout the rest of this article we assume that pollinator A1 grows comparatively faster
on plant P1 than on P2, and that pollinator A2 grows comparatively faster on plant P2 than
on P1, i.e.,
(e11b11)(e22b22) > (e21b21)(e12b12). (8)
We want to find pollinator preferences for plants that are evolutionarily stable (Hofbauer and Sigmund,
1998). Interestingly, Appendix B shows that there is no evolutionarily stable preference/strategy
where both pollinator species behave as generalists (i.e., preference (u1, v1) where 0 < u1 < 1
and 0 < v1 < 1). In other words, the interaction topology in Figure 2b,c,d does not exist
when pollinators preferences are adaptive. In fact either both species are specialists, or one
species is a generalist and the other specializes on the plant that makes it grow faster. Table
1 lists all possible ESSs as a function of plant and pollinator population densities. Transitions
between ESSs in plant phase space occur along four lines P2 = QiP1 (i = a, b, c, d), called isolegs
(Rosenzweig, 1981; Pimm and Rosenzweig, 1981; Krˇivan and Sirot, 2002), where
Qa(A1, A2) =
a1b11e11(w2 + b21A1 + b22A2)
a2b21e21w1
, (9a)
Qb(A1, A2) =
a1b11e11(w2 + b22A2)
a2b21e21(w1 + b11A1)
, (9b)
Qc(A1, A2) =
a1b12e12(w2 + b22A2)
a2b22e22(w1 + b11A1)
, (9c)
Qd(A1, A2) =
a1b12e12w2
a2b22e22(w1 + b11A1 + b12A2)
. (9d)
At fixed pollinator densities isolegs delineate five regions (denoted as I-V in Table 1) in the
first quadrant of the P1P2 plane where pollinators behave as specialists or generalists. Appendix
B shows that when pollinator A1 is a generalist and A2 specializes on P2 (region II in Table
1), the ESS of A1 is
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Region Conditions ESS (u1, v1) Description
I Qa(A1, A2)P1 < P2 (0, 0) A1 & A2 specialize on P2
II Qb(A1, A2)P1 < P2 < Qa(A1, A2)P1 (u
∗
1, 0) A1 generalist, A2 specializes on P2
III Qc(A1, A2)P1 < P2 < Qb(A1, A2)P1 (1, 0) A1 specializes on P1, A2 specializes on P2
IV Qd(A1, A2)P1 < P2 < Qc(A1, A2)P1 (1, v
∗
1) A1 specializes on P1, A2 generalist
V P2 < Qd(A1, A2)P1 (1, 1) A1 & A2 specialize on P1
Table 1: Dependence of evolutionarily stable pollinator preferences on plant (P1, P2) and polli-
nator densities (A1, A2). Thresholds Qi (i = a, b, c, d) are given by (9) and u
∗
1 and v
∗
1
by (10).
u∗1 =
e11b11a1P1(w2 + b21A1 + b22A2)− e21b21a2P2w1
b11b21(e11a1P1 + e21a2P2)A1
, (10a)
and when A2 is a generalist and A1 specializes on P1 (region IV in Table 1), the ESS of A2 is
v∗1 =
e12b12a1P1(w2 + b22A2)− e22b22a2P2(w1 + b11A1)
b12b22(e12a1P1 + e22a2P2)A2
. (10b)
In the next section we use isolegs and isoclines to study plant–plant competition.
3.2. Plants compete for pollinator preferences
Here we use isocline analysis to study the dynamics of the plant sub-system at fixed pollinator
densities A1 and A2, when pollinators are adaptive. Unlike in the case with fixed preferences,
pollinator isolegs partition the P1P2 plane into five regions listed in Table 1. Isolegs P2 =
QiP1 (i = a, b, c, d; see (9)) are rays passing through the origin (dashed lines in Figures 3
and 5). Inequality (8) implies that the slopes of isolegs satisfy Qd < Qc < Qb < Qa and,
consequently, regions I, II, III, IV and V are ordered in a clockwise sequence (Figure 3). As
a result of this partition of the positive quadrant, plant isoclines are defined piece-wise, and
they are considerably more complex when compared to the situation where pollinators have
fixed preferences (cf. Figure 3 vs. Figure 1). Plant isoclines in regions I, III, and V are easy
to describe analytically (Appendix C). However, in regions II and IV, plant isoclines are highly
non-linear and although they can be calculated using some computer algebra software (e.g.,
Mathematica), the resulting expressions are too complex and they are not useful for further
mathematical analysis.
In what follows we will assume that each plant monoculture is viable, i.e., for P1
a1(r11b11A1 + r12b12A2)
w1 + b11A1 + b12A2
> m1, (11a)
and for P2
a2(r21b21A1 + r22b22A2)
w2 + b21A1 + b22A2
> m2. (11b)
This means that each plant equilibrates with pollinator densities when alone (section 2.1).
Then plant isoclines have the following general properties:
1. Isoclines consist of four connected segments, as shown by e.g., Figure 3a. The isocline
of plant P1 (P2) intersects the P1 (P2) axis at the origin and at its pollinator-dependent
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carrying capacity in region V (I). These boundary equilibria
(P1, P2) =
(
K1
(
1− m1(w1 + b11A1 + b12A2)
a1(r11b11A1 + r12b12A2)
)
, 0
)
(12a)
and
(P1, P2) =
(
0, K2
(
1− m2(w2 + b21A1 + b22A2)
a2(r12b21A1 + r22b22A2)
))
, (12b)
are shown as filled circles on the axes of Figures 3 and 5. Appendix C shows that provided
these boundary equilibria exist (i.e., they are positive), they are locally asymptotically
stable.
2. The isoclines are linear in regions I, III and V, in which both pollinators are specialists.
Within these regions, u1 and v1 remain fixed at 0 or 1. If c2 = 0 (c1 = 0) the isocline
of plant P1 (P2) is vertical (horizontal), as shown in Figure 3 (cf., Figure 1a). If c2 > 0
(c1 > 0) the isocline of plant P1 (P2) is negatively sloped within these regions, as shown
in Figure 5 (cf., Figure 1b,c,d).
3. The isoclines are non-linear in regions II and IV, in which one pollinator is generalist and
the other specialist. The segment of the plant P1 (P2) isocline which is in region II (IV)
passes through the origin.
4. The isocline of plant P1 (P2) does not cross region I (V). This is because in region I (V),
plant P2 (P1) has two pollinators, but P1 (P2) has none and goes extinct in this region.
5. The population density of plant P1 (P2) increases in the region below (to the left) its
isocline, and decreases in the region above (to the right).
While there can be at most one interior plant equilibrium when pollinator preferences for plants
are fixed (section 2.1), there can be multiple interior equilibria when preferences are adaptive,
because isoclines intersect in multiple points.
In the rest of this section we consider two particular scenarios that illustrate the complexities
of plant population dynamics under adaptive pollinator preferences:
• Scenario I: Plant population dynamics along the gradient in pollinator A1 density. In
this scenario the density of pollinator A2 is kept fixed and both pollinators are equally
good for each plant (r11 = r12, r21 = r22). Plants do not compete for factors external to
pollination (c1 = c2 = 0).
• Scenario II: Plant population dynamics along the gradient in plant inter-specific competi-
tion for external factors. In this scenario we assume that plant inter-specific competition
is symmetric and we set c = c1 = c2. We also assume that A1 (A2) is the best pollinator
of plant P1 (P2) (r11 > r12, r22 > r21).
Both scenarios are parameterized so that plant boundary equilibria (12a) and (12b) exist, i.e.,
pollinator densities are high enough so that each plant can achieve a positive growth rate when
alone.
The main purpose of scenario I is to explore how relative changes in pollinator densities
influence plant community composition. An important motivation is the growing interest in
the consequences of alien pollinator invasions (Traveset and Richardson, 2006), and the man-
agement of pollinator populations (Geslin et al., 2017). To focus solely on plant competition
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for pollination services, we remove the effect of competition for other factors (by setting com-
petition coefficients equal to zero).
In Scenario II we explore how competition for external factors (e.g., space, nutrients) in-
fluences competition between plants for pollinator preferences. Because of condition (8), this
scenario also assumes that P1 (P2) and A1 (A2) are better for one another. Such matching
can be due to matching in plant and pollinator morphologies (Fontaine et al., 2005).
3.2.1. Scenario I. Effects of changes in pollinator composition: Alternative plant stable
states
Figure 3 illustrates plant population dynamics for scenario I. Panel (a) shows the situation
where pollinator A1 density is the same as pollinator A2 density. Plant isoclines intersect in
region IV, and the vector field indicates that the corresponding equilibrium is unstable. Thus,
there is bi-stability: depending on initial conditions either plant P1 or P2 is excluded, and
the plant community becomes a monoculture. As density of pollinator A1 increases (panel b),
the single plant equilibria (12a) and (12b) increase too. As a result, there are three isocline
intersections in regions II, III and IV. The equilibrium in region III is stable (because (4) holds,
see Appendix C) and the equilibria in regions II and IV are unstable. Again, plant coexistence
depends on initial conditions: if one plant is initially too rare plant population dynamics will
converge to a monoculture of the other plant, but if the two plants are initially abundant
enough, stable coexistence follows. At the coexistence equilibrium pollinators specialize on
different plants (see Table 1). In panel (c) pollinator A1 is more abundant than pollinator
A2, and two additional equilibria occur in region II, one stable and the other unstable. Thus,
there are two stable coexistence equilibria now (one in region II and the other in region III).
At the stable equilibrium that is in region II, pollinator A1 is a generalist and A2 is a plant
P2 specialist. As in panel (b), at the equilibrium that lies in region III, pollinators specialize
on different plants. Finally, in panel (d), further increase in pollinator A1 leads to a single
coexistence equilibrium in region II where A1 is a generalist and A2 plant P2 specialist.
Overall, the main effect of increasing pollinator A1 density with respect to A2, is the reduction
of region III where both pollinators specialize on different plants, in favor of region II where
A1 is a generalist and A2 a specialist. Here we see (Figure 4) that along the gradient in
A1 density, the topology of the interaction web changes. When population density of A1 is
low, both pollinators specialize on different plants. As population density of A1 increases,
A1 becomes a generalist. We also observe that plant P2 experiences hysteresis : the stable
equilibrium in region III jumps to the stable equilibrium in region II at A1 ≈ 11.7 as pollinator
density A1 increases, but the stable equilibrium moving along branch II jumps back to the
stable equilibrium moving along branch III at A1 ≈ 8.7 when pollinator density A1 decreases.
Another important consequence of pollinator A1 increase is that region I (V), in which P1
(P2) always decreases, become smaller. This makes easier for plants to invade one another and
achieve coexistence.
In summary, scenario I shows that: (i) adaptive foraging preferences can lead to alternative
plant coexistence stable states and (ii) continuous changes in pollinator composition (i.e., A1 :
A2 ratio) produce discontinuous changes in plant–pollinator interaction structure.
3.2.2. Scenario II. Effects of plant competition for external factors: Trait-mediated
apparent facilitation
Plant dynamics for scenario II are illustrated in Figure 5. The isolegs (dashed lines, (9))
and boundary equilibria (12a) and (12b) do not change across panels (a–d), because they are
independent of the competition coefficient c = c1 = c2. Within regions I, III and V the isoclines
are linear while in regions II and IV they are non-linear.
10
0 10 20 30 40
0
10
20
30
40
P1
P 2
(a: A1 = 1)
I
II
III
IV
V
iso
le
g−
a
iso
leg
−b
isole
g−c
isoleg−
d
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
10
20
30
40
50
P1
P 2
(b: A1 = 2)
I
II
III
IV
V
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
10
20
30
40
50
P1
P 2
(c: A1 = 10)
I
II
III
IV
V
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
10
20
30
40
50
P1
P 2
(d: A1 = 12)
I
II
III
IV
V
A1 A2
P1 P2
A1 A2
P1 P2
A1 A2
P1 P2
A1 A2
P1 P2
A1 A2
P1 P2
III IV VIII
Figure 3: Isoclines of plants P1 (black) and P2 (gray), isolegs (dashed lines), and vector field
of plant population dynamics (arrows), under adaptive pollinator preferences and
increasing pollinator A1 density (A1, scenario I). Filled (open) circles represent stable
(unstable) equilibria. Regions of pollinator preference are defined in Table 1, and
corresponding interaction topologies are indicated at the bottom. Parameters: rij =
0.1, m1 = 0.01, m2 = 0.0075, ci = 0, ai = 0.4, wi = 0.25, bij = 0.1, e11 = e22 = 0.2,
e21 = e12 = 0.1, Ki = 50, A2 = 1. Note: parts of the isoclines are not shown in (c,d),
but these parts do not intersect at any equilibrium.
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Figure 4: Bifurcation plot for plant P2 in scenario I. Thin solid lines represent stable equilibria
with one plant extinct. Thick solid lines represent stable coexistence equilibria, next
to corresponding interaction topology. Dashed lines represent unstable equilibria.
Roman numerals (I to V) indicate the location of equilibria within preference regions
given by the ESS (Table 1). Labels along the top of the plot correspond to panels in
Figure 3.
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When plant inter-specific competition is low (Figure 5a), plant population dynamics are
qualitatively similar to panels (b,d) in Figure 3 of scenario I, i.e., plants can coexist at a stable
equilibrium. However, there is an important qualitative difference here: At the coexistence
equilibrium both plants attain higher density when compared with their monoculture densities
(boundary equilibria). In other words, when inter-specific plant competition is weak, we observe
mutual plant facilitation. Let us consider the plant P1 boundary equilibrium in region V. In
this region P1 is pollinated by both pollinators. However, when A2 is a poor pollinator for
P1 (i.e., r11 > r12 as assumed in Figure 5), P1 can achieve a higher birth rate when it is
pollinated by A1 only. So, if there is an invasion of plant P2 from outside which moves the
plant densities in region III, pollinator A1 specializes on plant P1 and plant P2 is pollinated
by its best pollinator A2 only. Consequently, the P1 population equilibrium increases above
its monoculture level. Appendix C shows that the necessary condition for this facilitation of
plant P1 by the presence of P2 to happen is that r11/r12 > 1 + w1/(b11A1), which means
that pollinator A1 density must be high enough. In addition, such a facilitation can happen
only when inter-specific competition between plants is not too high. We remark that this
facilitation is not the usual one (Revilla and Krˇivan, 2016) where an increase in one plant
density increases the pollinator density which, in turn, increases the other plant density. This
mechanism cannot operate in the current model that assumes pollinator population densities
are fixed. The facilitation that we observe here is due to changes in pollinator preferences, where
by increasing plant P2 density, pollinator A2 switches from pollinating plant P1 to pollinating
P2, which leads to an increase of P1 population density. To distinguish this mechanism from
density mediated facilitation caused by increase in pollinator density, we call this mechanism
indirect trait-mediated facilitation (sensu Bolker et al., 2003).
As inter-specific competition increases, plant equilibrium population densities in region III
will be decreasing below those they achieve in a monoculture (boundary equilibria). When
plant inter-specific competition is strong so that c > 1, the equilibrium in region III becomes
unstable (i.e., (4) does not hold, see also Appendix C), but plants can still coexist at alternative
stable states. In Figure 5b, the local dynamics around the unstable equilibrium in region III is
like in Figure 1c, where perturbations cause either plant P1 to displace P2 or vice versa. Like
in scenario I, we have two alternative stable states at which both plants coexist. The most
abundant plant in each state is the one pollinated by both pollinators. Further increase of
the competition coefficient eliminates all equilibria in region IV, but the stable equilibrium in
region II remains, with pollinator A1 a generalist and A2 specialized on P2 (Figure 5c). Finally,
if competition is too strong there are no equilibria in regions II and IV and we have mutual
exclusion (Figure 5d) where, depending on the initial conditions, one plant outcompetes the
other plant (cf. Figure 1c).
Figure 6 shows the corresponding bifurcation plot for scenario II. As competition for extrinsic
factors (i.e., not for pollination) gets stronger, both plant equilibrium densities tend to decrease,
even in the region of alternative stable states (1 > c > 1.3) where P1 can be either abundant
(stable IV branch) or rare (stable II branch). There is only a small region where plant P1
increases with competition (0.9 > c > 1), i.e., where the combined effects of exploitative
competition and competition for pollination (i.e., trait-mediated plant facilitation) is more
favorable for P1 than for P2 (which decreases, not shown). Notice that in comparison to Figure
4 which shows transitions between two stable interaction topologies, Figure 6 shows transitions
between three stable interaction topologies.
In summary, scenario II shows that: (i) adaptive foraging preferences can result in indirect
trait-mediated plant–plant facilitation, by matching plants with their best pollinators; (ii)
continuous changes in competition for factors external to pollination can produce discontinuous
changes in interaction structure and coexistence for plants competing for pollination services;
and (iii) plants can coexist even when inter-specific competition is stronger than intra-specific
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Figure 5: Isoclines of plants P1 (black) and P2 (gray), isolegs (dashed lines), and vector field of
plant population dynamics (arrows), under adaptive pollinator preferences and with
increasing plant competition (ci, scenario II). Filled (open) circles represent stable
(unstable) equilibria. Regions of pollinator preference are defined in Table 1, and
corresponding interaction topologies are indicated at the bottom. Parameters: r11 =
r22 = 0.5, r12 = r21 = 0.1, mi = 0.02, ai = 0.1, wi = 0.1, bij = 0.1, e11 = e22 = 0.2,
e21 = e12 = 0.1, Ki = 50, A1 = 11, A2 = 10. Note: parts of the isoclines are not
shown in (a), but these parts do not intersect at any equilibrium.
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Region Conditions ESS (u1, v1) Description
I A2 < SaA1 + Ia (0, 0) A1 & A2 specialize on P2
II SaA1 + Ia < A2 < SbA1 + Ib (u
∗
1, 0) A1 generalist, A2 specializes on P2
III SbA1 + Ib < A2 < ScA1 + Ic (1, 0) A1 specializes on P1, A2 specializes on P2
IV max{ScA1 + Ic , SdA1 + Id} < A2 (1, v∗1) A1 specializes on P1, A2 generalist
V A2 < SdA1 + Id (1, 1) A1 & A2 specialize on P1
Table 2: ESS as a function of pollinator densities. Isoleg slopes Si(P1, P2) and intercepts with
the A2 axis Ii(P1, P2) (i = a, b, c, d) are given by (13), and u
∗
1 and v
∗
1 by (10).
competition for factors other than pollination. In the next section we use isolegs and isoclines
to study pollinator–pollinator competition.
3.3. Pollinators compete for plant resources
In this section we analyze population dynamics of adaptive pollinators at fixed plant densities.
Unlike in the case of fixed preferences (Figure 2), now we must partition the first quadrant of the
pollinator plane A1A2 into different regions using isolegs (Figure 7), according to Table 2 (see
Appendix D). The isolegs are linear in A1 and they are given by A2 = Si(P1, P2)A1+ Ii(P1, P2)
(where i = a, b, c, d) where slopes and intercepts are
Sa(P1, P2) = − b21b22 , Ia(P1, P2) = a2b21e21P2w1−a1b11e11P1w2a1b11b22e11P1 ,
Sb(P1, P2) =
a2e21b21P2
a1e11b22P1
, Ib(P1, P2) =
a2b21e21P2w1−a1b11e11P1w2
a1b11b22e11P1
,
Sc(P1, P2) =
a2e22b11P2
a1e12b12P1
, Ic(P1, P2) =
a2b22e22P2w1−a1b12e12P1w2
a1b12b22e12P1
,
Sd(P1, P2) = − b11b12 , Id(P1, P2) = a1b12e12P1w2−a2b22e22P2w1a2b22b12e22P2 .
(13)
Compared to isolegs in the plant plane (Figures 3 and 5), in the pollinator plane isolegs
neither pass through the origin, nor all have positive slopes. Thus, for given parameter values
and plant population densities not all regions from Table 2 exist in the positive quadrant. In
general:
1. Regions II, III and IV always occur (see Figure 7). They are separated by the isoleg-b
(A2 = SbA1+ Ib) and the isoleg-c (A2 = ScA1+ Ic) with positive slopes Sb and Sc, respec-
tively. These isolegs do not intersect in the first quadrant of the A1A2 plane (Appendix
D).
2. Because of (8) the isoleg-c separating IV and III is steeper than the isoleg-b separating III
and II (Sc > Sb). Thus, regions II, III and IV are ordered in a counter-clockwise sequence
in the positive A1A2 plane.
3. Regions I and V are separated from regions II and IV, respectively, by isoleg-a and isoleg-d
with negative slopes Sa and Sd. Appendix D shows that at most one of these two regions
can exist for given parameters and plant population densities. E.g., in Figure 7a neither
of the two regions exist, while in 7b region I exists.
The partition of the pollinator plane results in pollinator isoclines that are more complex
than in the case of fixed preferences, but considerably simpler than plant isoclines in section 3.2.
The isoclines consist of three (e.g., Figure 7a) or two connected segments (e.g., the pollinator
A2 isocline in Figure 7b). Regions I and V contain no isocline segments. The segments within
16
0 10 20 30 40
0
10
20
30
40
A1
A 2
(a)
IV III
II
isole
g−b
iso
leg
−c
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
10
20
30
40
A1
A 2
(b)
IV III
II
I
isol
eg−
b
iso
leg
−c
isoleg−a
A1 A2
P1 P2
A1 A2
P1 P2
A1 A2
P1 P2
A1 A2
P1 P2
A1 A2
P1 P2
III IV VIII
Figure 7: Isoclines of pollinators A1 (black) and A2 (gray), isolegs (dashed lines), and dynamics
(vector field), under adaptive pollinator preferences. Filled (open) circles represent
stable (unstable) equilibria. Regions of pollinator preference are defined in Table 2,
and corresponding interaction topologies are indicated at the bottom. Parameters:
ai = 0.4, bij = 0.1, d1 = 0.1, d2 = 0.12, P1 = P2 = 20 in all panels; (a) e11 = e22 = 0.2,
e12 = e21 = 0.1, wi = 0.1; (b) e11 = e21 = e12 = 0.2, e12 = 0.1, w1 = 0.7, w2 = 0.2.
17
regions II and IV are linearly decreasing, and both isoclines are parallel in these two regions
(see Appendix D). Thus, generically, pollinators cannot coexist within regions II or IV. This
is unlike the case with fixed preferences, where the specialist has a linear isocline and the
generalist a curved isocline (Figure 2e,f). Finally, the segments of isoclines in region III are
vertical for A1 and horizontal for A2, because pollinators specialize on different plants (like in
Figure 2a). Thus, pollinator coexistence can only occur in region III when the vertical segment
of A1 and the horizontal segment of A2 intersect, as shown in Figure 7a. Given (8), Appendix
D demonstrates that pollinator coexistence by mutual invasion requires
b21e21
b22e22
<
d1
d2
<
b11e11
b12e12
, (14)
leading to a stable equilibrium in region III. If d1/d2 is too low to meet above inequalities,
pollinator A2 goes extinct as shown in Figure 7b, and if d1/d2 is too large A1 goes extinct
instead. The coexistence scenario in Figure 7a is called the ghost of competition past (Connell,
1980), because competition between pollinators causes selection for different plants which ends
competition in the long term. What happens here is that the preference trade-off ( u1+u2 = 1
and v1 + v2 = 1) causes disadvantage for the generalist when combining its best and worst
resources. This is not the case for the specialist that fully commits to its best resource. Thus,
in region II (IV), selection drives A1 (A2) individuals to increase preference towards its preferred
plant P1 (P2). As a consequence, pollinators specialize on different plants.
In summary, the results show that population dynamics of two adaptable pollinators com-
peting for two plants do not allow stable coexistence between two generalists, one generalist
and one specialist, and two specialists on the same plant. In other words, coexistence demands
absolute niche segregation where each pollinator has its own plant.
4. Discussion
In this article we study how pollinator adaptation affects coexistence in a community module
consisting of two plants and two pollinators. We assume that pollinators preferences for plants
are adaptive and they correspond to evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) at given plant and
pollinator densities. Such strategies cannot be invaded by any other mutants with different
strategies. We prove that the strategy where both pollinators are generalists is never evolu-
tionarily stable. Then we study plant–plant and pollinator–pollinator population dynamics.
We observe that at fixed pollinator densities, adaptive pollinator preferences for plants lead to
complex plant dynamics characterized by alternative stable states. Such alternative states do
not exist when interaction strengths between pollinators and plants are fixed. We also observe
a trait-mediated facilitation (sensu Bolker et al., 2003) between plants due to changes in pol-
linator preferences where introduction of an alternative plant can increase population density
of the original plant, without increasing pollinator density. When plant densities are fixed,
our analysis of pollinator–only dynamics shows that a stable coexistence of a generalist and a
specialist pollinator is not possible when both pollinators are adaptive foragers. Thus, at the
pollinator coexistence equilibrium, each plant must have its own pollinator.
Our analyses combine an evolutionary approach with population dynamics. The evolutionary
approach is based on isolegs (Rosenzweig, 1981; Pimm and Rosenzweig, 1981; Krˇivan and Sirot,
2002) analysis. Isolegs split the plant (or pollinator) phase space into several regions that are
characterized by pollinator specialization or generalism. The population dynamic approach
is based on isocline analysis. When compared to standard models of population dynamics,
the case where pollinators are adaptive foragers leads to isoclines that are defined piece-wise
depending on the pollinator optimal strategy. For example, when interaction strengths between
pollinators and plants are fixed (i.e., pollinators are inflexible foragers), plant–plant dynamics
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follow the Lotka–Volterra competition model with isoclines being straight lines (Figure 1, top
row). However, when pollinators are adaptive foragers, plant isoclines are highly non-linear
(e.g., Figure 3). It is this emerging non-linearity that shows striking consequences of adaptive
pollinator behavior in the interaction web studied in this article.
In order to get insights on plant and pollinator coexistence, we assume that one mutualistic
guild, the plants or the pollinators, stays at constant densities, while the other undergoes
population dynamics. This is a limitation, but such conditions are not uncommon in nature.
E.g., plants can be long lived trees or shrubs, while pollinators can be comparatively short
lived, e.g., insects. The assumption of pollinator densities being constant while plants undergo
population dynamics can represent situations where plants are short lived (e.g., grasses or
forbs), while pollinator densities are mainly controlled by factors other than mutualism (e.g.,
pollinators may be limited by availability of artificial beehives or tree holes). Another possibility
is that plant dynamics take place in a small locality or a patch, and this patch has a certain
pollinator carrying capacity which is rapidly filled by visiting pollinators (Feldman et al., 2004)
coming from a much larger region. This can be the case of massively introduced managed
pollinators, spilling over from mass flowering crops into wild plant communities (Geslin et al.,
2017).
4.1. Adaptive pollinator preferences
When two pollinators compete for resources provided by two plants, we predict five qualitatively
different pollinator preferences that are evolutionarily stable (Table 1). These strategies are
characterized either as full specialization of a pollinator on a single plant or generalism. We
proved that the situation where both pollinators are generalists is never evolutionarily stable
and it should not be observed in nature. The distribution of pollinator preferences is similar to
the ideal free distribution (IFD) of two consumers using two resource patches (Krˇivan, 2003).
Pollinator preferences were derived under conditions of low species diversity (only four
species), and constant population densities. Interestingly, such conditions are approximated
in the experiments of Fontaine et al. (2005). These authors used two plant groups: plants
with open (P1), and tubular (P2) flowers; and two pollinator groups: syrphid flies (A1), and
bumblebees (A2). Each group consisted of three species. This diversity ensures that each
pollinator group can use each plant group. However, syrphid flies are morphologically better
adapted to open flowers, whereas bumblebees are better adapted to tubular flowers. Plants and
pollinators interacted at fixed densities within cages. One experiment found that when alone,
each pollinator group displayed generalism. However, when together, syrphids tended to visit
open flowers almost exclusively, whereas bumblebees tended to maintain their generalism. This
observation corresponds with our partially mixed ESS with one specialist and one generalist
pollinator. Further experimentation, with controlled variation of P1:P2 and A1:A2 abundance
ratios, will be necessary to test our predictions (Table 1).
4.2. How adaptive preferences change plant coexistence
Analysis of plant dynamics when pollinator densities are fixed indicates that pollinator prefer-
ences can modify the plant community to a large extent. Under fixed pollinator preferences,
plant population dynamics are described by the Lotka–Volterra competition model. Thus,
plants either coexist at an equilibrium, or one plant is outcompeted by the other plant (Figure
1). In the bi-stable case when initial conditions determine the outcome of competition (Figure
1c), the preferred plant that survives has a larger domain of attraction so it is expected to
win more frequently. When pollinator preferences are adaptive, initial conditions have major
effects on plant coexistence for three main reasons. First, since pollination is obligatory for
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both plants, coexistence requires that no plant is initially too rare, because otherwise positive
feedbacks make the rare plant less preferred and the common plant more preferred (the rich
get richer and the poor get poorer situation), causing the rare plant extinction. The same feed-
backs prevent invasion of rare plants, unless invaders start above minimum density thresholds.
Second, pollinator adaptation enables alternative stable states in plant coexistence. Third,
plants can coexist even when their inter-specific competition is so strong that one plant would
be outcompeted when pollinators were inflexible foragers.
Many mutualistic models predict critical transitions in community composition as a result of
an environmental stress (e.g., warming, habitat fragmentation, changes in phenology). These
critical transitions can lead to states of very low diversity, or community collapse when mutu-
alism is obligatory. In large communities, critical transitions are preceded by a gradual accu-
mulation of species extinctions that cause interaction loss (e.g., simulated by random species
removal, Jelle Lever et al., 2014). On a much smaller scale (only four species) our scenario I,
where the density of pollinator A1 increases while the density of the second pollinator A2 is
kept fixed, demonstrates critical transitions (i.e., discontinuous changes both in numbers and
the interaction topology) due to interaction loss. In this scenario, transitions between single
and alternative stable states in the plant community are due to switches in one pollinator (A1)
strategy. When the pollinator is rare it specializes on the best plant (Fig. 3b). As its population
increases the pollinator switches to a generalist (Fig. 3c), in response to increased competition.
We do not have empirical evidence for transitions like in scenario I, but we can hypothesize one
of practical importance. Consider a managed pollinator (e.g., A1 = honeybees) coexisting with
wild pollinators (e.g., A2 = bumblebees). We assume that managed pollinators start with high
densities e.g., thanks to artificial beehives. Because of competition for plants this large popula-
tion will generalize (Fontaine et al., 2008), pollinating many plants and maintaining high plant
diversity (in Figure 4 this corresponds to pollinator A1 above A1 ≈ 8.7 and plant P2 density
given by the solid curve labeled by II). A parasite infestation will cause the managed pollinator
population to collapse to much lower densities (Guzma´n-Novoa et al., 2010) (below A1 ≈ 8.7
in Figure 4). Competition between pollinators for plants will be lower and they will specialize
(pollinator A1 specializes on P1 in Figure 4). This will lead to a critical transition in the plant
community where P2 density drops to P2 ≈ 17 (solid line labeled by III). In order to revert
back to the condition where P2 had a higher density (P2 ≈ 27 and larger, solid line labeled
by II), pollinator A1 must become generalist again, but due to hysteresis the density of this
managed pollinator must be raised to levels higher than before the collapse (i.e., A1 must reach
population density above A1 ≈ 11.7 in Figure 4), e.g., by providing additional beehives. This
hypothetical scenario could be tested using semi-closed experimental plant communities, by
controlling the access of massively introduced managed pollinators living nearby (Geslin et al.,
2017).
Competition for pollinator preferences can result in plant coexistence at densities that are
smaller (scenario I, Figure 3, specially for P2) or larger (scenario II, Figure 5a) than the
densities when each plant is alone. The first prediction was widely confirmed empirically
(Chittka and Schu¨rkens, 2001; Aizen et al., 2014). Regarding the second prediction, the exper-
iments of Fontaine et al. (2005) discussed before indicate that plant facilitation is a potentially
realistic outcome. In that experiment, plants with open flowers (P1) were better adapted to
syrphid flies (A1) and vice-versa, whereas plants with tubular flowers (P2) were better adapted
to bumblebees (A2). Bumblebees are generalists and they are slightly better at using tubular
flowers. When the four groups were placed together, competition forced syrphids to concen-
trate on open flowers and bumblebees to prefer tubular flowers. At the end of experiment
each plant group was taken care of by its best pollinator group, and ended up producing more
seeds. This experiment and our predictions demonstrate that given enough functional diversity,
i.e., differences in plant and pollinator functional traits, adaptive pollination can improve not
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only pollinator coexistence but also plant coexistence to the point where plants can end up
facilitating one another indirectly. We note that this facilitation between plants can be due
to changes in pollinator densities (indirect density-mediated facilitation), or due to changes
in trait (indirect trait-mediated facilitation, Bolker et al., 2003) which is caused by changes
in pollinator preferences for plants. The interplay between such indirect effects with direct
competition between plants for other factors (e.g., space or nutrients, described by competition
coefficients), can give rise to alternative stable coexistence states (Figure 5b) (Hernandez, 1998;
Gerla and Mooij, 2014; Zhang et al., 2015; Holland and DeAngelis, 2009; Holland et al., 2002).
4.3. How adaptive preferences change pollinator coexistence
The analysis of pollinator population dynamics described by equations (1c,1d) predicts that
adaptation of pollinator preferences results in competitive outcomes that are similar to those
with fixed preferences: both pollinators can coexist, one always excludes the other, or initial
conditions determine which pollinator survives and which goes extinct. In particular, there
are no alternative stable states such as we see in the plant sub-system. There are, however,
important qualitative differences in the community interaction topology. We already know that
the case where both pollinators are generalists is not evolutionarily stable and it cannot occur.
However, pollinator population dynamics also exclude pollinator stable coexistence in the case
where one pollinator is a specialist and the other a generalist. Thus, when pollinators adapt
their foraging preferences with changing population numbers, only pollinators that specialize
on different plants can coexist (Figure 7a). As a result, both pollinators stop to compete (the
ghost of competition past, Connell, 1980).
We get similar conclusions from numerical simulations of the full four species system (1)
with adaptive pollinator preferences (Table 1 or 2): pollinators either specialize on different
plants, or specialist pollinators are excluded by generalists (Appendix E shows representative
simulations). These results suggest that plant coexistence at alternative states is unlikely when
both plant and pollinator dynamics operate on similar time scales.
These conclusions have important implications for systems containing many pollinator species.
Most real plant–pollinator interaction networks are nested (Bascompte and Jordano, 2007).
This means that a minority of generalist pollinators can interact with many plants, but a ma-
jority of more specialized pollinators interact with a few plants only, typically subsets of the
plants used by the generalists. This causes a disadvantage for specialized pollinators that have
to compete for resources with generalist competitors. Numerical simulations show that adaptive
foraging tends to reduce the effect of nestedness on pollinator diet overlap (Valdovinos et al.,
2016). As a consequence, specialist pollinators experience less competition, pollination for
plants with less pollinators becomes more efficient, and more plants and pollinators can co-
exist in the long term. We observe the same mechanism in our two-pollinator–two-plant in-
teraction module. For example, consider a generalist pollinator A1 and a specialist A2 (i.e.,
0 < u1 < 1, v1 = 0) as a caricature of a nested network. Such interaction topology can be dy-
namically stable when preferences of generalist pollinators are fixed (Figure 2e), but not when
preferences adapt in which case either (i) both pollinators specialize on different plants (Figure
7a) or (ii) the specialist goes extinct (Figure 7b). In the first case nestedness is eliminated as
the pollinator A1 becomes a specialist.
4.4. Conclusions
As the take-home-message, our analysis of a two-plant–two-pollinator interaction web demon-
strates that adaptation of pollinator preferences for plants causes important changes in the
structure and dynamics of plant and pollinator communities. First, when pollinator prefer-
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ences are fixed, interactions between plants follow the Lotka–Volterra competitive dynamics
when pollinator densities are held constant. When plant densities are fixed, coexistence of gen-
eralist pollinators is possible. Second, when pollinator preferences adapt in order to maximize
fitness, plant competitive dynamics become more complex and plant coexistence at alternative
stable states and indirect plant–plant facilitation is possible, if pollinator densities are held con-
stant. At fixed plant densities competition between adaptive pollinators requires pollinators
specialize on different plants.
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A. Coexistence conditions for pollinators with fixed
preferences
We set αij = aiPieij and βi1 = uibi1, βi2 = vibi2 and re-write the pollinator sub-system (1c, 1d)
as
dA1
dt
=
{
α11β11
w1 + β11A1 + β12A2
+
α21β21
w2 + β21A1 + β22A2
− d1
}
A1
dA2
dt
=
{
α12β12
w1 + β11A1 + β12A2
+
α22β22
w2 + β21A1 + β22A2
− d2
}
A2. (A.1)
Model (A.1) has the trivial equilibrium (A1, A2) = (0, 0). When A2 = 0, the per-capita
population growth rate dA1/(A1dt) of pollinator A1 decreases monotonically with A1. Provided
the per capita birth rate of pollinator 1 when A1 = A2 = 0 is larger than is its per capita
population death rate, i.e.,
α11β11w2 + α21β21w1 > d1w1w2 (A.2)
there is exactly one A1-only equilibrium
(A1, 0) =
(−b+√b2 − 4ac
2a
, 0
)
,
where a = d1β11β21, b = d1(w2β11 + w1β21) − (α11 + α21)β11β21 and c = d1w1w2 − w2α11β11 −
w1α21β21.
If the opposite inequality in (A.2) holds, the per-capita population growth rate of pollinator
1 is always negative and the pollinator goes extinct. By symmetry, if
α12β12w2 + α22β22w1 > d2w1w2 (A.3)
there is a unique A2-only equilibrium.
Provided β11β22 − β12β21 6= 0, d2α11β11 − d1α12β12 6= 0, and d2α21β21 − d1α22β22 6= 0, model
(A.1) has at most one coexistence equilibrium
Aˆ1 =
w2β12 − w1β22 + (α11α22β11β22−α12α21β12β21)[d1(α12+α22)β12β22−d2(α21β12β21+α11β11β22)](d2α11β11−d1α12β12)(d2α21β21−d1α22β22)
β11β22 − β12β21
Aˆ2 =
w1β21 − w2β11 + (α11α22β11β22−α12α21β12β21)[d2(α11+α21)β11β21−d1(α12β12β21+α22β11β22)](d2α11β11−d1α12β12)(d2α21β21−d1α22β22)
β11β22 − β12β21 (A.4)
if Aˆ1 > 0 and Aˆ2 > 0.
Now we study the local asymptotic stability of the equilibria. The jacobian of (A.1) is
J =

 G1 − A1
(
α11β
2
11
W 2
1
+
α21β
2
21
W 2
2
)
−A1
(
α11β11β12
W 2
1
+ α21β21β22
W 2
2
)
−A2
(
α12β11β12
W 2
1
+ α22β21β22
W 2
2
)
G2 − A2
(
α12β
2
12
W 2
1
+
α22β
2
22
W 2
2
)

 (A.5)
where
G1(A1, A2) =
α11β11
w1 + β11A1 + β12A2
+
α21β21
w2 + β21A1 + β22A2
− d1 (A.6)
G2(A1, A2) =
α12β12
w1 + β11A1 + β12A2
+
α22β22
w2 + β21A1 + β22A2
− d2 (A.7)
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and
W1(A1, A2) = w1 + β11A1 + β12A2 (A.8)
W2(A1, A2) = w2 + β21A1 + β22A2. (A.9)
At the trivial equilibrium the jacobian is diagonal and its eigenvalues are λ1 = G1(0, 0) and
λ2 = G2(0, 0). Thus, the trivial equilibrium is unstable if any of (A.2) or (A.3) hold. At the
A1-only equilibrium G1(A1, 0) = 0 and the eigenvalues are
λ1 = −A1
(
α11β
2
11
W 21
+
α21β
2
21
W 22
)
, λ2 = G2(A1, 0).
Thus, stability depends on the sign of G2(A1, 0). If G2(A1, 0) < 0 pollinator 1 is stable against
invasion by pollinator 2, if G2(A1, 0) > 0 pollinator 1 can be invaded by pollinator 2. G2(A1, 0)
can be evaluated explicitly, but the resulting expression is quite complex and we do not give
it here. By symmetry, the A2-only equilibrium is stable against invasion by pollinator 1 if
G1(0, A2) < 0 and unstable if G1(0, A2) > 0.
Provided that the coexistence equilibrium exists (i.e., Aˆ1 > 0, Aˆ2 > 0 in A.4), thenG1(Aˆ1, Aˆ2) =
G2(Aˆ1, Aˆ2) = 0 by definition. Thus the trace of the jacobian is negative, which means that
stability depends on the sign of the jacobian determinant, which is
∆ =
Aˆ1Aˆ2
(W1W2)2
(β11β22 − β12β21)(α11α22β11β22 − α12α21β12β21). (A.10)
If ∆ > 0 the equilibrium is locally stable, if ∆ < 0 it is unstable. If we replace back the
definitions of α’s and β’s in (A.10) the stability condition reads
(u1b11v2b22 − v1b12u2b21)(e11e22u1b11v2b22 − e12e21v1b12u2b21) > 0.
The above results can be used to study coexistence of specialized pollinators. First, we
consider specialized pollinators pollinating a single plant. For example, let us assume that both
pollinators pollinate plant P1 only, i.e., u1 = v1 = 1. Then β11 = β12 = 0 and substituting
these values in (A.1) shows that the two isoclines are parallel lines, i.e., generically, there is no
equilibrium. The same conclusion holds in the case where both pollinators specialize on plant
P2. Thus, two specialist pollinators cannot survive on a single plant.
Second, we consider two pollinators that specialize on different plants (either β12 = β21 = 0
or β11 = β22 = 0). For example, when β12 = β21 = 0 the interior equilibrium (A.4) is
(Aˆ1, Aˆ2) =
(
α11
d1
− w1
β11
,
α22
d2
− w2
β22
)
and stability condition (A.10) holds. The case where β11 = β22 = 0 is similar.
B. ESS and Nash equilibria
Throughout this appendix we assume that inequality (8) holds. From (7a) and (7b), for a given
pollinator distribution (u1, v1) ∈ [0, 1]×[0, 1], pollinator A1 payoffs when pollinating exclusively
plant P1 or plant P2 are
V1(u1, v1) =
a1e11b11P1
w1 + u1b11A1 + v1b12A2
, V2(u1, v1) =
a2e21b21P2
w2 + (1− u1)b21A1 + (1− v1)b22A2 .
Similarly, pollinator 2 payoffs are
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W1(u1, v1) =
a1e12b12P1
w1 + u1b11A1 + v1b12A2
, W2(u1, v1) =
a2e22b22P2
w2 + (1− u1)b21A1 + (1− v1)b22A2 .
First, we consider ESS at which both pollinators are specialists. We start with the case where
both pollinators specialize on plant 1. Strategy (u1, v1) = (1, 1) is an ESS provided V1(1, 1) >
V2(1, 1) andW1(1, 1) > W2(1, 1). These inequalities are equivalent to P2 <
a1b11e11w2
a2b21e21(w1+b11A1+b12A2)
P1
and P2 < QdP1, whereQd is given in (9d). Inequality (8) implies thatQd <
a1b11e11w2
a2b21e21(w1+b11A1+b12A2)
.
Consequently, for P2 < QdP1 strategy (u1, v1) = (1, 1) is the ESS. Now we consider the case
where pollinator 1 specializes on plant 1 and pollinator 2 on plant 2. Strategy (u1, v1) = (1, 0) is
an ESS provided V1(1, 0) > V2(1, 0) and W2(1, 0) > W1(1, 0). These inequalities are equivalent
to QbP1 > P2 > QcP1 where Qb is given in (9b). Now we consider the case where both polli-
nators specialize on plant 2. Strategy (u1, v1) = (0, 0) is an ESS provided V2(0, 0) > V1(0, 0)
and W2(0, 0) > W1(0, 0). These inequalities are equivalent to P2 > QaP1 where Qa is given in
(9d) and P2 >
a1b12e12(w2+b21A1+b22A2)
a2b22e22w1
P1. Inequality (8) implies that Qa >
a1b12e12(w2+b21A1+b22A2)
a2b22e22P2w1
.
Consequently, for P2 > QaP1 strategy (u1, v1) = (0, 0) is the ESS. Now we consider the case
where pollinator 1 specializes on plant 2 and pollinator 2 on plant 1. Strategy (u1, v1) = (0, 1)
is an ESS provided V2(0, 1) > V1(0, 1) and W1(0, 1) > W2(0, 1). These inequalities are equiv-
alent to P2 > QbP1 and P2 < QcP1. Inequality (8) implies that Qb > Qc. Consequently,
(u1, v1) = (0, 1) is never an ESS.
Second, we consider ESSs when the first pollinator is a generalist while the second pollinator
is a specialist. Let us assume that the second pollinator specializes on plant 2, i.e., we seek
ESS in the form (u1, 0) where 0 < u1 < 1. Such a strategy must satisfy V1(u1, 0) = V2(u1, 0)
and W2(u1, 0) > W1(u1, 0). Equality V1(u1, 0) = V2(u1, 0) leads to
u∗1 =
a1b11e11P1(w2 + b21A1 + b22A2)− a2b21e21P2w1
A1b11b21(a1e11P1 + a2e21P2)
.
This value is between 0 and 1 provided QbP1 < P2 < QqP1. Inequality (8) implies that
W2(u
∗
1, 0) > W1(u
∗
1, 0). Thus, (u
∗
1, 0) is a Nash equilibrium. To prove it is also an ESS, we need
to verify its stability. Because functions Vi (i = 1, 2) are non-linear in u1, we use the local ESS
condition (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998) u∗1V1(u1, 0) + u
∗
2V2(u1, 0) > u1V1(u1, 0) + u2V2(u1, 0)
for every (u1, u2) (u1 + u2 = 1, u1 > 0, u2 > 1) close to (but different from) (u
∗
1, u
∗
2). This
condition is equivalent to
(a2b11e11P1(A2b22 + A1(b21 − b21u1) + w2))2
A1b11b21(a1e11P1 + a2e21P2)(A1b11u1 + w1)(A2b22 + A1(b21 − b21u1) + w2) > 0. (A.11)
The numerator is positive and the denominator equals to 0 for u1 = − w1A1b11 < 0 and u1 =
A1b21+A2b22+w2
A1b21
> 1. Because the denominator is a quadratic function and its graph is an upside
down parabola, inequality (A.11) holds for all 0 < u1 < 1. This shows that (u1, v1) = (u
∗
1, 0) is
an ESS.
Now we assume that the second pollinator specializes on plant 1, i.e., we seek ESS in the form
(u1, 1) where 0 < u1 < 1. Such a strategy must satisfy V1(u1, 1) = V2(u1, 1) and W1(u1, 1) >
W2(u1, 1). The equality leads to
u∗1 =
a1b11e11P1(w2 + b21A1)− a2b21e21P2(w1 + b12A2)
A1b11b21(a1e11P1 + a2e21P2)
.
Then
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W1(u
∗
1, 1) =
b12b21e12(a1e11P1 + a2e21P2)
b21e11(A1b11 + A2b12 + w1) + b11e11w2
W2(u
∗
1, 1) =
b11b22e22(a1e11P + a2e21P2)
b21e21(A1b11 + A2b12 + w1) + b11e21w2
and inequality (8) implies that W2(u
∗
1, 1) > W1(u
∗
1, 1) and thus (u
∗
1, 1) is never an ESS.
Third, we consider ESSs when the first pollinator is a specialist while the second pollinator
is a generalist. Let us assume that the first pollinator specializes on plant P1, i.e., we seek ESS
in the form (1, v1) where 0 < v1 < 1. Such a strategy must satisfy V1(1, v1) > V2(1, v1) and
W1(1, v1) =W2(1, v1). The equality leads to
v∗1 =
a1b12e12P1(w2 + b22A2)− a2b22e22P2(w1 + b11A1)
A2b12b22(a1e12P1 + a2e22P2)
.
This value is between 0 and 1 provided QdP1 < P2 < QcP1. Inequality (8) implies that
V1(1, v
∗
1) > V2(1, v
∗
1). The local ESS condition requires v
∗
1W1(1, v1)+v
∗
2W2(1, v1) > v1W1(1, v1)+
v2W2(1, v1) for every (v1, v2) (v1 + v2 = 1, v1 > 0, v2 > 1) close to (but different from) (v
∗
1, v
∗
2).
This condition is equivalent to
(a1b12e12P1(A2b22(v1 − 1)− w2) + a2b22e22P2(A1b11 + A2b12v1 + w1))2
A2b12b22(w2 −A2b22(v1 − 1))(a1e12P1 + a2e22P2)(A1b11 + A2b12v1 + w1) > 0. (A.12)
The numerator is positive and the denominator equals to 0 for v1 = −A1b11+w1A2b12 < 0 and
v1 =
w2
A2b22
+1 > 1. Because the denominator is a quadratic function and its graph is an upside
down parabola, inequality (A.12) holds for all 0 < v1 < 1. This shows that (u1, v1) = (1, v
∗
1) is
an ESS.
Now we assume that the first pollinator specializes on plant P2, i.e., we seek ESS in the form
(0, v1) where 0 < v1 < 1. Such a strategy must satisfy V2(0, v1) > V1(0, v1) and W1(0, v1) =
W2(0, v1). The equality leads to
v∗1 =
a1b12e12P1(w2 + b21A1 + b22A2)− a2b22e22P2w1
A2b12b22(a1e12P1 + a2e22P2)
.
However, inequality (8) implies that V1(0, v
∗
1) > V2(0, v
∗
1) so that no ESS in the form (0, v1)
exists.
Fourth, we consider the case where both pollinators are generalists. This situation corre-
sponds to ESS of the form (u1, v1) with 0 < u1 < 1 and 0 < v1 < 1. Such an ESS must satisfy
V1(u1, v1) = V2(u1, v1) and W1(u1, v1) = W2(u1, v1). These equalities are equivalent to
a1e11b11P1(w2 + u2b21A1 + v2b22A2) = a2e21b21P2(w1 + u1b11A1 + v1b12A2)
a1e12b12P1(w2 + u2b21A1 + v2b22A2) = a2e22b22P2(w1 + u1b11A1 + v1b12A2).
Because w1+u1b11A1+ v1b12A2 > 0 and w2+u2b21A1+ v2b22A2 > 0, inequality (8) implies that
these two equations do not have any solution (u1, v1) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]. Thus, it is impossible for
both pollinators to be generalists.
C. Plant dynamics in regions I, III and V
First we calculate plant P1 boundary equilibrium. From Table 1 it follows that this equilibrium
is in region V where both pollinators pollinate P1. Substituting (u1, v1) = (1, 1) in (1a) and
(1b), and solving for equilibria when P1 6= 0 and P2 = 0 leads to equilibrium (12a).
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The plant population dynamics in region V are
dP1
dt
=
(
a1(r11b11A1 + r12b12A2)
w1 + b11A1 + b12A2
(
1− P1 + c2P2
K1
)
−m1
)
P1
dP2
dt
= −m2P2,
and provided plant 1 is viable (i.e., (11a) holds), equilibrium (12a) exists (is positive) and
is locally asymptotically stable. Following the same steps above mutatis mutandis, leads to
equation (12b) for plant P2 boundary equilibrium in region I (where ESS is (u1, v1) = (0, 0),
see Table 1). Analogously, if (11b) holds then (12b) exists and is locally asymptotically stable.
Now we consider plant population dynamics in region III. According to Table 1 the ESS
strategy in this region is (u1, v1) = (1, 0), i.e., pollinator A1 (A2) interacts only with plant P1
(P2). Substituting these preferences in (1a) and (1b), plant population dynamics in region III
are described by the Lotka–Volterra competition model
dP1
dt
= (s1 −m1)P1
(
1− P1 + c2P2
H1
)
dP2
dt
= (s2 −m2)P2
(
1− P2 + c1P1
H2
)
,
where
s1 =
a1r11b11A1
w1 + b11A1
, s2 =
a2r22b22A2
w2 + b22A2
, H1 = K1
(
1− m1
s1
)
, H2 = K2
(
1− m2
s2
)
.
Plant population dynamics in region III depend on the position of plant isoclines
P1 + c2P2 = H1
P2 + c1P1 = H2.
Provided the plant isoclines intersect in region III, the coexistence equilibrium is
(Pˆ1, Pˆ2) =
(
H1 − c2H2
1− c1c2 ,
H2 − c1H1
1− c1c2
)
. (A.13)
For (A.13) to be in region III, it must satisfy QbPˆ1 < Pˆ2 < QcPˆ1, where Qb and Qc are given
in (9b) and (9c), respectively. Substituting Qb , Qc and (A.13) we get
b21e21
b11e11
<
a1(w2 + b22A2)(H1 − c2H2)
a2(w1 + b11A1)(H2 − c1H1) <
b22e22
b12e12
. (A.14)
Provided (A.14) holds, the local stability of (A.13) depends on the competition coefficients.
From the Lotka–Volterra theory (A.13) is locally stable if c1c2 < 1. If c1c2 > 1, (A.13) is
unstable, and trajectories will approach either isoleg-b and cross into region II, or approach
isoleg-c and cross into region IV depending on the initial conditions. If (A.14) does not hold
there is no plant equilibrium in region III.
In the special case where c1 = c2 = 0, the stable equilibrium in region III is
(Pˆ1, Pˆ2) = (H1, H2) =
(
K1(A1b11(a1r11 −m1)−m1w1)
a1A1b11r11
,
K2(A2b22(a2r22 −m2)−m2w2)
a2A2b22r22
)
.
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At this equilibrium plant 1 density is higher than is the plant density at the boundary equilib-
rium (12a) in region V iff
r11
r12
> 1 +
w1
b11A1
.
This shows that provided r11 > r12 and pollinator A1 is abundant enough, plant P1 density at
the interior equilibrium in region III will be higher than is the plant P1 density at the boundary
equilibrium. Analogous conclusions apply to plant P2.
D. Coexistence conditions for pollinators with adaptive
preferences
Using Table 1 in the main text, we rewrite isolegs characterizing regions I-V in terms of polli-
nator densities. For example, isoleg-a that separates regions I and II in the plant plane P1P2 is
given by equation P2
P1
= Qa(A1, A2) =
a1b11e11(w2+b21A1+b22A2)
a2b21e21w1
. Solving for A2 leads to isoleg-a in
the pollinator plane
A2 = SaA1 + Ia = −b21
b22
A1 +
a2b21e21P2w1 − a1b11e11P1w2
a1b11b22e11P1
,
and the other isolegs in the pollinator plane A1A2 are obtained analogously and they are listed
in Table 2 in the main text.
Isoleg-b and isoleg-c (which enclose region III) do not intersect in the positive part of the
A1A2 plane. Indeed, the intersection point is A1 = (Ic − Ib)/(Sb − Sc). From (13), Ic − Ib =
a2P2w1
a1P1b2
(
e22b22
e12b12
− e21b21
e11b11
)
and Sb − Sa = a2P2a1P1
(
e21b21
e11b11
− e22b22
e12b12
)
have different signs, thus isoleg-b
and isoleg-c intersection is non-positive.
Now we show that for given parameters and plant population densities it is not possible that
both regions I and V co-exist. We observe that region I exists in the positive quadrant iff Ia > 0,
because in this case isoleg-a intersects both A1 and A2 axes at positive values. Similarly, region
V exists in the positive quadrant iff Id > 0, because in this case isoleg-d intersects both A1 and
A2 axes at positive values. However, condition (8) rules out the possibility that both Ia and Id
are positive.
We determine conditions for pollinator coexistence in regions I to V. Appendix A shows that
two pollinators specialized on the same plant (both u1 and v1 equal to 0 or 1) cannot coexist.
This rules out coexistence in regions I and V. Now, let us consider region II where pollinator
A1 is a generalist and A2 specializes on plant P2. Thus 0 < u1 = u
∗
1 < 1, v1 = 0, and the A2
isocline is
a2e22b22P2
w2 + (1− u∗1)b21A1 + b22A2
= d2. (A.15)
Because the payoff of pollinator A1 when pollinating plant P1 is the same as when pollinating
plant P2, the A1 isocline is
a2e21b21P2
w2 + (1− u∗1)b21A1 + b22A2
= d1. (A.16)
Substituting u∗1 (10a) in (A.15) and (A.16) shows that both these equalities define parallel lines
in pollinator phase space. Thus, generically, there cannot be a coexistence equilibrium in region
II. Pollinator A2 will displace A1 if
e22b22
e21b21
>
d2
d1
,
or A1 will displace A2 if the opposite inequality holds.
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In region IV, pollinator A2 is a generalist and A1 specializes on plant P1. Because of
symmetry, the last result applies mutatis mutandis. This means that either A1 will displace
A2 if
e11b11
e12b12
>
d1
d2
,
or A2 will displace A1 if the opposite inequality holds. If
e11b11
e12b12
>
d1
d2
>
e21b21
e22b22
, (A.17)
then A1 can be invaded by A2 and vice versa and coexistence by mutual invasion occurs.
Finally, let us consider region III, in which pollinator A1 specializes in plant P1 (u1 = 1),
and A2 specializes in P2 (v1 = 0). The pollinator isoclines intersect at
(Aˆ1, Aˆ2) =
(
a1e11P1
d1
− w1
b11
,
a2e22P2
d2
− w2
b22
)
. (A.18)
To be a coexistence equilibrium however, (Aˆ1, Aˆ2) must lie between isolegs SbA1 + Ib and
ScA1 + Ic, i.e., SbAˆ1 + Ib < Aˆ2 < ScAˆ1 + Ic. Substituting (A.18) in these inequalities leads to
b21e21
b22e22
<
d1
d2
<
b11e11
b12e12
,
which are the conditions for mutual invasion (A.17). Thus, a coexistence equilibrium within
region III is locally stable. Since there are no coexistence equilibria within regions II and IV,
we conclude that if (A.17) holds there is a single stable coexistence equilibrium within region
III.
E. Combined plant–pollinator dynamics
Figure A.1 illustrates the population dynamics of the four species system (1) when pollinator
preferences for plants are fixed (left panels) or adaptive (right panels). Panels in each row
assume the same parameters and initial conditions. Initial preferences u1(0), v1(0) are calculated
as the ESS (Table 1 or 2) for the initial densities P1(0), P2(0), A1(0), A2(0). In the left column
of Figure A.1 these preferences are kept fixed at their initial values (their time series remain
horizontal), while in the right column preferences track changes in population densities (ESS)
instantaneously.
In the top row (panels a,b) pollinator A1 starts as a generalist biased towards plant P1
(u1 ≈ 0.6), and A2 as a P2 specialist (v1 = 0). In panel (a) these preferences remain fixed and
all four species attain stable coexistence. In panel (b) preferences adapt and the four species
attain coexistence again, but pollinator A1 turns into a plant P1 specialist. Here adaptation
leads to the end of competition between A1 and A2, which do not share any plant.
The bottom row (panels c, d) uses a different parameter set, and the initial conditions make
pollinator A1 a plant P1 specialist (u1 = 1) and A2 a P2 specialist (v1 = 0). Thus, A1 and A2
do not compete initially, and four species coexistence happens if preferences remain fixed (c). If
preferences adapt, panel (d) shows that pollinator A2 becomes a generalist. As the preference
for P1 grows larger for A2, strong competition drives specialist pollinator A1 towards extinction.
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Figure A.1: Dynamics of system (1). Preferences given according to: (a,c) ESS at t = 0 and
kept fixed for t > 0; (b,d) ESS at all times (t ≥ 0). Densities (left axes) represented
by P1: green squares; P2: red diamonds; A1: pink circles; A2: blue triangles. Plant
1 preferences (right axes) represented by u1: 5-pointed, v1: 6-pointed stars. Inset
graphs display final plant–pollinator interactions (dash stroke for extinct species).
Parameters (a,b,c,d): ri = 0.1, mi = 0.01, bij = 0.1, ai = 0.4, wi = 0.25, e11 =
e22 = 0.2, d1 = 0.12, d2 = 0.1; (a,b): Ki = 50, e21 = 0.17, e12 = 0.1; (c,d):
K1 = 60, K2 = 30, e12 = 0.17, e21 = 0.1. Competition coefficients (a,b): ci = 0.2;
(c,d): c1 = 0.4, c2 = 0.1.
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